State v. Morin Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 41832 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
11-13-2014
State v. Morin Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41832
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Morin Respondent's Brief Dckt. 41832" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5093.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5093
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) No.41832 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) 
) Ada Co. Case No. 
vs. ) CR-MD-2012-2898 
) 
VICTORIA BEA MORIN, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
_____________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ADA 
HONORABLE THERESA GARDUNIA, Magistrate Judge 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN, District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
PAUL R. PANTHER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
(208) 334-4534 
ATTORNEYS FOR 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
HEIDI M. JOHNSON 
Ada County Public Defender's Office 
200 W. Front Street, Ste. 1107 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 287-7 400 
ATTORNEY FOR 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
I 
( 
I 
j; 
I 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1 
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings .................................. 1 
ISSUES ............................................................................................................ 5 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 6 
I. Morin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's 
Decision Regarding The Magistrate's Denial Of Morin's 
II. 
Motion·To Compel ...................................................................... 6 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 6 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 6 
C. Morin Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In 
The Denial Of Her Motion To Compel. ............................. ? 
Morin Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her 
Motion To Exclude Relevant Evidence That She Had 
Carboxy-THC In Her Blood ....................................................... 15 
A. Introduction .................................................................... 15 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... 15 
C. Carboxy-THC, Although Not Itself An Intoxicant, 
Is Still Relevant To A DUI Charge .................................. 16 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ................................................. ; ........................ 20 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 381, 924 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App. 1996) ........................ 11 
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008) .................................. 6 
Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981) .................................... 6 
State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 184 P.3d 215 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................ 6 
State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 264 P.3d 75 (Ct. App. 2011 ) .............................. 15 
Statev. Koch, 157 Idaho 89,334 P.3d 280 (2014) ............................. 7, 10, 11, 13 
Statev. Merwin, 131 ldaho642, 962 P.2d 1026 (1998) ..................................... 15 
Statev. Parker, 157 Idaho 132,334 P.3d 806 (2014) ........................................ 13 
Statev. Pearce, 146 Idaho 241,192 P.3d 1065 (2008) ..................................... 15 
State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 835 P .2d 1349 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................... 7 
State v. Stark, 157 Idaho 29, 333 P.3d 844 (Ct. App. 2013) ........................ 16, 17 
State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 899 P.2d 416 (1995) ........................................ 7 
STATUTES 
I.C. § 18-8004 .................................................................................................... 16 
RULES 
1.C.R. 16 ............................................................................................................... 7 
I 
l 
\ 
l 
/: j' 
f, ii ' 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Victoria Morin appeals from the district court's appellate decision affirming 
the magistrate's judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding 
Morin guilty of misdemeanor driving under the influence ("DUI"). Morin 
challenges the denial of her motion to compel additional information regarding 
the state's expert, and her motion to exclude evidence related to the presence of 
Carboxy-THC in Morin's blood. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Kellie and her husband were driving down the road when they saw a 
motorist, later identified as Morin, who appeared to be stranded on the side of the 
road. (4/23/2013 Tr., p.127, Ls.5-8, p.127, L.24 - p.128, L.14, p.155, L.18 -
p.156, L.2.) Kellie and her husband stopped to see if they could assist Morin and 
Morin "had a hard time logically explaining what was going on or what was 
wrong." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.128, L.15 - p.129, L.1.) Eventually, they realized 
Morin wanted to "borrow a phone" and she said she "thought she was out of 
gas." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.129, Ls.1-4.) Morin then asked if they could "take her to 
a gas station, and pay for gas, and get her back to her car." (4/23/2013 Tr., 
p.129, Ls.16-18.) Concerned about Morin's behavior, because Morin "seemed to 
be slurring her speech a little bit," and "didn't seem quite right," they told her they 
would "call the State Incident Response and see if someone would come help 
her." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.129, L.20 - p.130, L.1.) Kellie testified she was 
"concerned that [Morin] wouldn't be appropriate or fit to drive." (4/23/2013 Tr., 
1 
p.130, Ls.9-10.) Kellie called for assistance and was advised that someone 
would be sent to assist. (4/23/2013 Tr., p.130, Ls.17-20.) 
Corporal Jeff Jayne responded to the call for assistance. (4/23/2013 Tr., 
p.136, L.23 - p.137, L.3, p.154, L.8 - p.156, L.2.) Consistent with Kellie's 
observations of Morin, Corporal Jayne noted some unusual behaviors from 
Morin. In particular, Corporal Jayne "immediately" saw Morin's pupils were 
dilated, she had a "white, encrusted substance on the right corner of her mouth," 
her speech was slurred, "[s]he was awkwardly or unusually happy about certain 
subjects that just didn't make sense as to why they were humorous," and 
"occasionally, she would drift off and talk about unrelated subjects." (4/23/2013 
Tr., p.156, Ls.18-25.) Morin was also unable to locate her driver's license 
immediately upon request; she looked for it in her vehicle "for quite a length of 
time," but the license was "in a common place in her wallet that most would find 
very easy to find." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.157, Ls.14-20.) 
At Corporal Jayne's request, Morin attempted to perform a series of 
standard field sobriety tests, two of which Morin failed. (4/23/2013 Tr., p.160, 
Ls.17-23, p.160, L.21 - p.182, L.25; see Exhibit 1.) Corporal Jayne also 
conducted two additional evaluations on scene and completed a full drug 
recognition evaluation following Morin's arrest, which supported Corporal Jayne's 
conclusion that Morin was impaired. (4/23/2013 Tr., p.182, L.3 - p.184, L.21, 
p.186, L.3 - p.206, L.11, p.282, Ls.18-21.) In addition, an assist officer on scene 
advised Corporal Jayne that she "detected the odor of marijuana from 
somewhere inside [Morin's] vehicle." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.185, L.13 - p.186, L.1; 
2 
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see also p.345, Ls.8-15.) Consistent with this finding, Corporal Jayne later 
smelled a "strong odor of burnt marijuana" on Morin's clothing and, during his 
drug evaluation, Corporal Jayne noticed Morin "had a yellow-green paste on the 
outside of her tongue," which is caused by marijuana; Morin admitted using 
marijuana the weekend prior to her arrest to relieve anxiety and shoulder pain, 
and claimed the smell on her clothes was from being "with somebody else who 
had been smoking." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.203, Ls.6-10, p.206, L.16 - p.207, L.15, 
p.329, L.22 - p.331, L.15.) Based on his entire evaluation, Corporal Jayne 
concluded Morin was "under the influence of cannabis." (4/23/2013 Tr., p.206, 
Ls.12-15; see also p.210, L.22 -p.211, L.24.) Test results from a blood sample 
taken from Morin revealed the presence of the marijuana metabolite Carboxy-
THC, amphetamine, venlafaxine, and nor-venlafaxine; amphetamine is a central 
nervous system stimulant, venlafaxine is a central nervous system depressant, 
and nor-venlafaxine is a metabolite of venlafaxine. (4/23/2013 Tr., p.208, L.24 -
p.210, L.18, p.357, L.19-p.362, L.3.) 
The state charged Morin with DUI and operating a vehicle with an invalid 
license. (R., pp.8-9, 38-39.) Morin pied guilty to the invalid license charge, but 
proceeded to trial on the DUI charge, at which the jury found her guilty. 
(4/23/2013 Tr., p.22, L.12- p.23., L.25; R., p.111.) The court entered judgment 
and Morin filed a timely appeal to the district court. (R., pp.114, 117-119.) 
On intermediate appeal, Morin asserted the trial court erred in (1) denying 
her motion to compel, (2) allowing Dr. Dawson to testify about opinions he did not 
disclose prior to trial, and (3) denying her motion in limine to exclude Carboxy-
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THC testimony. (R., p.153.) The district court affirmed the magistrate's 
judgment and Morin filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court. (R., pp.199-211, 
214-215.) 
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ISSUES 
Morin states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Morin's Motion to 
Compel thereby denying her of her constitutional right to due 
process and a fair trial guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 
13 of the Idaho Constitution when the trial court allowed 
testimony over her objection regarding Dr. Gary Dawson's 
expert opinions, which were never disclosed to the defense 
prior to trial? 
II. Did the trial court err when it denied Ms. Morin's Motion in 
Limine, which sought to exclude testimony regarding 
Carboxy-THC, a simple metabolite of THC? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Morin failed to show error in the district court's decision 
affirming the magistrate's denial of Morin's motion to compel additional 
information regarding the scope of Dr. Gary Dawson's testimony? 
2. Has Morin failed to show the district court erred in denying her 
motion to exclude evidence regarding the presence of Carboxy-THC given that 
the evidence is relevant to proving driving under the influence even though 
Carboxy-THC is not itself an intoxicant? 
5 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Morin Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Decision Regarding The 
Magistrate's Denial Of Morin's Motion To Compel 
A. Introduction 
Morin contends the trial court erred in denying her motion to compel 
additional details regarding the testimony the state intended to elicit from Dr. 
Dawson. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-14.) Review of the record and the applicable 
legal standards shows the state's disclosure was adequate to satisfy I.C.R. 
16(b )(7), and even if the magistrate erred in denying Morin's motion to compel, 
the district court correctly concluded any error was harmless. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The 
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact 
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." Jg_,_ 
"If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if 
the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] 
the district court's decision as a matter of procedure." Jg_,_ (citing Losser, 145 
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 
(1981)). 
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The appellate court will uphold a trial court's "decision regarding discovery 
violations if it is supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record." 
State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, _, 334 P.3d 280, 284 (2014) (citing State v. 
Stradley. 127 Idaho 203, 207-08, 899 P.2d 416, 420-421 (1995)). 
C. Morin Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The Denial Of Her Motion 
To Compel 
Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7) requires the state to provide, upon written 
request, a written summary or report of any expert testimony that the state 
intends to introduce at trial. The summary must describe "the witness's opinions, 
the facts and data for those opinions, and the witness's qualifications." I.C.R. 
16(b)(7). On March 7, 2012, Morin filed a motion pursuant to Rule 16. (R., 
pp.14-15.) In response, on December 21, 2012, the state provided the following 
summary: 
Dr. Dawson is an expert in toxicology and pharmacology and will 
assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence regarding the 
effects of drugs on the behavior and performance of the defendant 
as reported in this case. Dr. Dawson will utilize generally accepted 
scientific principles of absorption, distribution, metabolization, and 
excretion of drugs. Testimony may include information on the 
effects of the drugs consumed by the defendant in this case and 
the possible side effects of said drugs. 
(R., p.189. 1) 
1 It does not appear that the actual written summary was included in the record 
on appeal; rather, the summary is quoted in the parties' respective briefs to the 
district court as well as in the district court's opinion. (R., pp.156, 189, 202-203.) 
Although missing portions of the record are presumed to support the actions of 
the court below, see State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541, 835 P.2d 1349, 1352 
(Ct. App. 1992), because it appears the parties agree on the content of the 
state's summary, the failure to include the actual summary in the record is 
presumably not an issue. 
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Morin filed a motion to compel on January 14, 2013. (R., pp.46-47.) In 
her motion, Morin did not acknowledge that the state did provide the foregoing 
summary; instead, Morin claimed that the state "ha[d] not complied with the rules 
of discovery." (R., pp.46-47.) In her motion, Morin sought to compel disclosure 
of a ''written summary or report of any testimony" the state intended to introduce 
through Dr. Gary Dawson, to include a summary of Dr. Dawson's "opinions, the 
facts and data for those opinions, and [his] qualifications." (R., p.46.) At the 
hearing on Morin's motion to compel, defense counsel explained that she wanted 
Dr. Dawson to "provide opinions as to why and how [he] believe[s] that [Morin] 
was under the influence of an intoxicating substance." (4/8/2013 Tr., p.21, Ls.3-
5.) The magistrate ultimately concluded the state "met its burden" under Rule 16 
and denied the motion. (4/8/2013 Tr., p.33, Ls.11-13.) 
On intermediate appeal, the district court stated: 
The state's disclosure in this case was very generic. A 
review of the content of the disclosure reveals that it is classic 
"boiler plate" and not at all specific to the facts of this case. The 
defense articulated that fact at the motion to compel. The rule 
requires that the expert disclose their "opinions, the facts and data 
for those opinions" as to the facts of the case upon which discovery 
is requested. 
In this case the disclosure by the state did not contain any 
specific opinions or data of their expert witness that specifically 
related to this case, as evidenced · by Dr. Dawson's extensive 
testimony at trial. 
One of the key components of providing thorough expert 
disclosure in criminal cases is to give the defense the opportunity to 
determine whether or not they would need to call an expert witness 
to perhaps rebut the State's expert witness. In addition a lack of full 
specific disclosure places the opposing party in the awkward and 
potentially unethical position of contacting the expert to gain 
discovery that should have been presented by the state. Clearly 
8 
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Dr. Dawson's testimony and that of Officer Jayne did conflict when 
Dr. Dawson testified that Effexor does not cause horizontal gaze 
nystagmus yet the Officer, Jayne, who is a certified drug 
recognition evaluator, testified that all central nervous system 
depressants cause HGN and that it is very similar to alcohol. 
The court finds, therefore, that the state should have been 
required to provide a more complete disclosure to Ms. Morin 
concerning Dr. Dawson's intended trial testimony. 
(R., p.205.) 
Despite finding the magistrate erred in the denial of the motion to compel, 
the district court also found the error harmless because Morin failed to 
"demonstrate[] that her substantial rights were prejudiced." (R., p.205.) 
On appeal, Morin asserts that Dr. Dawson's "testimony was far greater 
than what the state's disclosure revealed" (Appellant's Brief, p.7) and then she 
identifies various portions of Dr. Dawson's trial testimony regarding what Carboxy 
THC is, signs and symptoms of Carboxy THC, the presence of amphetamine in 
Morin's blood and what amphetamine is, the presence of venlafaxine and nor-
venlafaxine in Morin's blood and what those drugs are, and whether there is a 
nystagmus with Effexor (Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11). Morin claims this testimony 
"was more than just known and generally accepted scientific principles of 
absorption, distribution, metabolization, and excretion of drugs." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.13.) This may be true, but the state's disclosure was not so limited; it 
also notified Morin that Dr. Dawson's "[t]estimony may include information on the 
effects of the drugs consumed by [Morin] in this case and the possible side 
effects of said drugs." (R., p.189.) Identifying and explaining the drugs found in 
Morin's systems is within the scope of the testimony the state indicated it would 
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elicit from Dr. Dawson. While the state's disclosure did not include the same 
detail that Dr. Dawson's testimony did, Rule 16 does not require as much. The 
Idaho Supreme Court's recent opinion in Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 334 P.3d 280, is 
instructive. 
In Koch, the state called Mydell Yeager as an expert witness regarding 
child sexual abuse. 157 Idaho at_, 334 P.3d at 284-285. The state provided 
the following summary of testimony it intended to elicit from Ms. Yeager: 
Ms. Yeager's curriculum vitae is attached. She'll testify to the 
dynamics of delayed disclosure as it relates to child sexual abuse. 
The state intends to elicit expert testimony from Mydell Yeager 
regarding behavior of children who have been sexually abused and 
Ms. Yeager will testify that it is rare that a child immediately 
discloses their sexual abuse especially when they know the 
perpetrator. Ms. Yeager will testify about the dynamics of child 
sexual abuse as it relates to grooming a victim, keeping the abuse 
secret, the effects and threats on whether a child chooses to 
disclose. 
157 Idaho at_, 334 P.3d at 284-285. 
Koch claimed the disclosure was insufficient under I.C.R. 16(b)(7) 
because it did not include a summary or report. 19..:. at 285. The trial court 
overruled the objection because the rule does not require an expert "to produce a 
written report where none had previously existed" and the court advised Koch 
that he "could object to any of Yeager's testimony that varied from the State's 
disclosed summary." 19..:. Koch renewed his Rule 16 complaint on appeal and the 
Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning: 
Here, the State's disclosures were sufficient. The State 
provided Koch with a summary of Yeager's opinions, which did not 
involve a particularly technical or scientific subject matter, and 
informed him of the main opinion she was going to testify to: ""it is 
rare that a child immediately discloses their sexual abuse especially 
10 
when they know the perpetrator. While the State did not 
specifically disclose that Yeager's opinions were based on her 
training and experience, which would be the better practice, it did 
provide Yeager's curriculum vitae. . . . Moreover, the bases for 
Yeager's conclusions were adequately explored by defense 
counsel on cross-examination with no particular difficulty. 
Koch, 157 Idaho at_, 334 P.3d at 285-286. 
Similar to Koch, the state disclosed one of the main topics about which Dr. 
Dawson would testify- "information on the effects of the drugs consumed by the 
defendant in this case and the possible side effects of said drugs" - and much of 
what Morin complains about is Dr. Dawson's testimony on that very topic. (See 
generally Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.) Further, that testimony does not seem to 
qualify as opinion testimony at all. Rather, what a drug is and what its side 
effects seem to be entirely based on facts. Just because those facts are 
communicated by an expert does not mean they are converted into an opinion for 
purposes of Rule 16. Although the district court found that Rule 1_6 required the 
state to disclose additional details regarding Dr. Dawson's testimony, this Court 
may conclude otherwise and affirm on that basis. Abbott v. State, 129 Idaho 
381, 385, 924 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Ct. App. 1996) (even if trial court is incorrect, 
appellate court may uphold the trial court's decision if supported by an alternative 
legal theory). 
Even if thjs Court agrees with the district court that the motion to compel 
should have been granted, the district court was correct in concluding the error 
was harmless. The district court stated that, although the magistrate "err[ed] in 
denying the Motion to Compel, Ms. Morin has not demonstrated that her 
substantial rights were prejudiced." (R., p.205.) The district court then noted 
11 
Morin's claims that she was "unable to adequately defend herself against the 
state's accusations" and "unable to challenge the evidence presented against her 
at trial and unable to adequately cross-examine Dr. Dawson or challenge any 
provided testimony." (R., pp.205-206.) In response to these assertions, the 
district court outlined Dr. Dawson's testimony and then addressed trial counsel's 
ability to cross-examine Dr. Dawson: 
On cross-examination, Ms. Morin's attorney specifically 
noted that Dr. Dawson had informed [her], prior to the trial, that it 
was essentially his opinion that Ms. Morin was under the influence 
of marijuana, venlaxine, and nor-venlaxine. Consequently, Ms. 
Morin was provided this opinion of Dr. Dawson, prior to the trial. 
In addition, on cross-examination, Ms. Morin's attorney 
elicited Dr. Dawson's admission that he had never personally 
conducted a drug recognition evaluation examination, that he has 
never been trained as a drug recognition evaluator, and that he has 
only ever testified on behalf of the state concerning the effects of 
drugs and alcohol. He also admitted that he did not review any of 
Ms. Morin's medical records, nor had he ever contacted her treating 
physician. 
Ms. Morin's attorney also elicited Dr. Dawson's admission 
that he did not provide a written report in this case, "no information 
with regards to any studies, or scientifically peer reviewed studies, 
or anything like that", and had not "provided or made reference to 
any scientific studies as the basis for [his] opinions .... " 
Ms. Morin's attorney also attacked Dr. Dawson's testimony 
on the basis that it did not adequately take into account individual 
drug tolerances and absorption rates. She also attacked his 
testimony on the basis that it was contradicted by a study "that 
concluded that the effects from smoking cannabis products are felt 
within minutes and reach their peak within about 10 to 30 
minutes[.]" 
In short, Ms. Morin's attorney's cross-examination of Dr. 
Dawson was quite thorough and no facts have been presented to 
the court that Ms. Morin was prejudiced by the insufficient 
disclosure of the State's expert witness. 
12 
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(R., pp.207-208 (transcript citations omitted).) 
With respect to the district court's harmless error ruling, Morin appears to 
contend that the court "applied the incorrect standard" because it required her to 
demonstrate her substantial rights were prejudiced rather than determining "the 
error did not affect the outcome of the trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
Regardless of the district court's word choice, it is clear that the court correctly 
applied the standard; even if it did not, this Court may do so and affirm the district 
court's conclusion that the error was harmless. 
"If a substantial right is not affected, an abuse of discretion may be 
deemed harmless." State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, _, 334 P.3d 806, 814 
(2014) (citation omitted). "To establish harmless error, the State must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained." J-9.:. (quotations and citations omitted). A review of Dr. 
Dawson's testimony and defense counsel's cross-examination, which the district 
court conducted and detailed at length, supports the conclusion that any error 
relating to the denial of Morin's motion to compel was harmless. Significantly, as 
noted by the district court, trial counsel actually talked to Dr. Dawson prior to trial 
regarding his opinion. (Tr., p.433, L.14 - p.434, L.4.) 
Moreover, Dr. Dawson's testimony was "adequately explored by defense 
counsel on cross-examination with no particular difficulty." Koch, 157 Idaho at 
_, 334 P.3d at 286. In addition to the details of cross-examination included in 
the district court's appellate opinion, the record also shows that trial counsel 
capably and thoroughly cross-examined Dr. Dawson, in detail, regarding the 
13 
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drugs listed on Morin's lab results, including their side effects. (See generally Tr., 
pp.447-473.) Morin's claim that she "was unable to challenge the evidence 
presented against her and unable to adequately cross-examine Dr. Dawson or 
even meaningfully challenge any provided testimony" is belied by the record. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Morin's related claim that she was also deprived of "an 
opportunity to present a report to [her] own expert" also fails to withstand 
scrutiny. (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) It is unclear why Morin could not determine 
whether she needed to hire her own expert based on the information provided by 
the state regarding the scope of Dr. Dawson's anticipated testimony. Indeed, the 
state's disclosure was apparently sufficient for counsel to investigate the drugs 
by obtaining a password from her sister, who is a nurse, and access medication 
information from Medscape, which, according to counsel is used by "doctors, 
nurses, [and] physicians [sic]," and includes "patient handout[s]" for drugs. (Tr., 
p.454, Ls.9-22.) Counsel certainly could have elected to consult an expert for 
this purpose as opposed to a website had she chosen to do so. That she chose 
not to consult an expert does not mean the state's disclosure was inadequate. 
Morin has failed to show reversible error in relation to the denial of her 
motion to compel.2 
2 Morin also claims her constrtutional rights to due process and a fair trial were 
violated as a result of the state's failure to provide more information prior to trial 
regarding Dr. Dawson's testimony. (Appellant's Brief, pp.7-8.) This argument 
fails for the same reasons her rule-based argument fails. 
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Morin Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To Exclude 
Relevant Evidence That She Had Carboxy-THC In Her Blood 
A. Introduction 
Morin claims error in the admission of evidence that she had Carboxy-
THC present in her blood at the time of her traffic stop. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-
18.) More specifically, Morin argues that the evidence was inadmissible 
"[b]ecause Carboxy-THC is, by law, not an intoxicant." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) 
Morin's argument fails because, although Carboxy-THC is not itself an intoxicant, 
it was still relevant to whether Morin was driving under the influence. Morin's 
claim, therefore, fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The decision whether to admit evidence at trial is generally within the 
province of the trial court." State v. Healy, 151 Idaho 734, 736, 264 P.3d 75, 77 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citation omitted). "A trial court's decision regarding the 
admission of expert testimony is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. 
Pearce, 146 Idaho 241, 245, 192 P.3d 1065, 1069 (2008) (citing State v. Merwin, 
131 Idaho 642, 645, 962 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1998)). When the appellate court 
reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, it considers "(1) whether the 
lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with any legal 
standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason." kl (citation omitted). 
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C. Carboxy-THC, Although Not Itself An Intoxicant, Is Still Relevant To A DUI 
Charge 
Morin filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude: 
1. Any lab testing results showing the presence of "Carboxy-THC" 
in [her] blood stream; 
2. Opinion evidence from any police officer, lab personnel, or 
expert witness to the effect that Ms. Morin was driving under the 
influence of an intoxicant, specifically Carboxy-THC; and 
3. Testimony by any police officer or other witness, or other 
evidence, regarding any observations of impairment with respect to 
Carboxy-THC. 
(R., p.49.) 
The underlying premise of Morin's motion to exclude the foregoing 
evidence was that "as a matter of law, Carboxy-THC is not an intoxicating 
substance." (R., p.50 (emphasis original).) Thus, Morin concluded, "the 
presence of Carboxy-THC in [her] blood [was] not relevant to the charge of 
driving 'under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating 
substances."' (R., p.50 (quoting I.C. § 18-8004).) The magistrate denied Morin's 
motion and Morin pursued her relevance claim on appeal. The district court also 
rejected Morin's argument, stating: 
It is true, as the Court of Appeals stated in [ State v. Stark, 
157 Idaho 29, 333 P.3d 844 (Ct. App. 2013)], that carboxy THC is 
not an intoxicating drug in and of itself. However, the court does 
not believe that the Court of Appeal's [sic] holding in Stark, or the 
other cases [Morin] cites, means that the presence of carboxy THC 
cannot be relevant to the issue of whether or not a defendant was 
driving under the influence of marijuana. Rather, in the court's 
view, it is a factor that can be considered in deciding the issue, in 
the appropriate circumstances and this was such an appropriate 
circumstance. 
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Testing revealed the presence of carboxy THC in Ms. 
Morin's system. Dr. Dawson testified concerning the relationship 
between the presence of carboxy THC and recent use of 
marijuana. Testimony was also given at trial that Ms. Morin 
exhibited multiple signs of being under the influence of marijuana. 
She failed every field sobriety test. There was an odor of marijuana 
in her car and on her clothing. She also admitted marijuana use, 
though she was inconsistent about when this occurred. 
(R., p.210 (footnote omitted).) 
The district court was exactly right. In fact, the Court in Stark expressly 
said that although "Carboxy-THC, as opposed to THC, is not a drug or 
intoxicating substance but is, instead, a metabolite of marijuana," a "blood test 
indicating the presence of Carboxy-THC" does show "past marijuana use" and 
"[e]vidence of past drug use is relevant to a charge of driving under the influence 
if the State proves a connection between the past drug use and a driver's 
impairment at the time the motor vehicle was operated." Stark, 157 Idaho at_, 
333 P.3d at 847-848. The Court of Appeals identified the types of evidence that 
would be sufficient to make this "connection" as including evidence explaining (1) 
how "the results of the toxicology report could be extrapolated back to show 
intoxication at a specific time"; (2) "how quickly marijuana metabolites such as 
Carboxy-THC can be detected in a person's blood after ingesting marijuana"; (3) 
"how long th[e] [metabolites] can be detected after the intoxicating effects of 
marijuana have dissipated"; and (4) how the defendant's "behavior was 
consistent with the symptoms of marijuana use." Stark, 157 Idaho at _, 333 
P.3d at 848. This is precisely the type of evidence the state presented through 
Dr. Dawson. 
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Dr. Dawson explained that Carboxy-THC is an "inactive metabolite of 
tetrahydrocannibinol, which is one_ of the primary components in the marijuana 
leaf." (Tr., p.411, Ls.2-4.) Dr. Dawson then testified that the presence of 
Carboxy-THC indicates the individual has smoked or ingested 
tetrahydrocannibinol. (Tr., p.411, Ls.5-16.) Carboxy-THC can be in someone's 
blood "for some period of time" if the person is a chronic smoker but if the person 
is an "infrequent smoker[], it's more likely that the exposure was more acute." 
(Tr., p.411, Ls.17-22.) More acute exposure would be within 24 to 48 hours 
whereas a "chronic user" is "somebody who smokes either daily or several times 
a week." (Tr., p.411, L.23- p.412, L.4.) Dr. Dawson further testified that while a 
positive Carboxy-THC test tells you exposure has occurred, you would look to 
"other evidence, other pieces to tell [you]" when "exposure could have occurred." 
(Tr., p.412, Ls.11-17.) "If somebody was totally absent of any symptoms 
whatsoever of the impairment associated with tetrahydrocannibinol, that would 
[indicate] that the exposure was more distant." (Tr., p.412, Ls.18-21.) However, 
if there were "other symptoms that would be consistent with that exposure, that 
impairment, that would narrow that window considerably." (Tr., p.412, Ls.21-23.) 
Those other symptoms include dilation of the eyes, problems with cognitive 
function such as the "ability to think clearly, the ability to make decisions, short-
term memory," and the ability to have "a conversation that is reflective of the 
current context." (Tr., p.413, L.20 - p.414, L.6.) For example, it would not be 
"unusual to see disconnective speech or thought patterns that don't follow during 
that acute exposure phase." (Tr., p.414, Ls.7-9.) ''There's also the psychomotor 
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function," which is whether the person can "walk, do they have balance, can they 
do certain basic physical functions that a person who's not under the influence of 
some drug or medication" can perform. (Tr., p.414, Ls.10-15.) Finally, there are 
also "pathognomonic" signs, which include things such as "coating on the tongue, 
green coating on the tongue, which would indicate reasonably recent exposure," 
or "the odor of marijuana" is another sign of recent exposure. (Tr., p.414, L.24 -
p.415, L.11.) 
Based on a review of Corporal Jayne's reports and the video of Morin 
during the traffic stop, and considering the foregoing factors along with other 
information regarding the drugs found in Morin's system, Dr. Dawson concluded 
Morin was intoxicated and too impaired to drive. (Tr., p.416, L.2 - p.433, L.6.) 
The presence of Carboxy-THC in Morin's test results was relevant to Dr. 
Dawson's analysis and conclusion and, as such, the evidence was admissible. 
Morin has failed to show otherwise. 
The district court correctly concluded that Morin was not entitled to relief 
on either of her claims of error. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
decision affirming the judgment entered upon the jury verdict finding Morin guilty 
of DUI. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 2014. 
Attorney General 
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